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Abstract 
This paper is addressed to comparing inequality in distributions of 
two or more variables. Based on an extended version of the Lorenz 
Curve criterion, a theorem is proved which says that total income is 
always less unequally distributed than the most unequally distributed 
income component. As an illustration, a decomposition of the coëffi-
ciënt of variation of total income is given in terms of coefficients 
of variation of the income component. The possibilities are discussed 
to transfer the results of income inequality to the field of welfare 
inequality. An empirical illustration is given for interregional 
welfare inequalities in the Netherlands. 
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1
• Introduction 
The literature on inequality analysis shows that economists usually 
study inequality in terms of only one variable, mostly income. In-
equality in the context of more than one variable is seldom studied. 
This is not entirely satisfactory, if one wants to link income and 
welfare, since there are several other relevant determinants of wel-
fare, for example: health, housing, quality of natural environment and 
accessibility of public facilities. If one wants to avoid a one-sided 
view of the relative situation of low income groups, also the other 
welfare components have to be considered. Of course, much depends on 
the correlations between the various components. In the case of high 
and positive correlations between components, one may expect an aggra-
vating effect on aggregate welfare inequality, whereas in the case of 
low or negative correlations, a mitigating influence will occur. This 
paper is addressed among others to clarifying these issues. 
The literature on multidimensional inequality comparisons is rather 
thin. A short review is given by Marshall and Olkin (1979). They 
indicate that various definitions of inequality are possible. For 
example, Kolm (1977) presents results for the case where interrela-
tions between welfare components are assumed to be irrelevant in 
inequality comparisons. On the other hand, these interrelationships 
play a central role in a paper written by Atkinson and Bourguignon 
(1982) who study inequality comparisons by means of stochastic domi-
nance. In the references mentioned above, inequality comparisons 
relate to two different distributions of the same total bundie of 
commodities. The difference with the present paper is that here for 
one particular distribution, inequality in the distribution of the 
elements of the bundie is compared with inequality in the distribution 
of some aggregate indicator of the elements. 
In section 2, some results will be given of one-dimensional inequal-
ity analysis. Sections 3 and 4 are devoted to a special case of multi-
dimensional inequality, i.e. when the relationship between the aggre-
gate variable and the elements of the bundie is known to be additively 
separable by definition. In section 3 the relationship between these 
two is analysed without making use of a specific inequality measure. 
In section 4, results are presented for some specific inequality 
measures. Section 5 is addressed to the more general case of a welfare 
function which is not necessarily separable. Empirical results are 
presented in section 6. 
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2. One-dimensional Inequality 
The inequality among N persons (n=1,...,N) according to a certain 
variable (for example: income) can be studied as follows. Let 
x=(xt,... ,XJJ) be the allocation of a given amount of income among 
the N persons. Assume that the vector x is ordered so that 
x^xz>.. .£XJJ. Similarly, let yl = (y1,... .yw) be another allocation 
of the same amount with y^y^.. .^y^. 
Then one can define inequality as follows. 
Definition 1. Distribution x is less unequal than distribution y 
(or x is majorized by y, denoted as xLy) if: 
xx + ... + xn < y 1 + ... + yn for n=1,...,N-1 
Xt + ... + XN = yt + ... + yN (1) 
This definition means that when two distributions are compared by 
Lorenz curves, the upper curve respresents a less unequal distribution 
than the lower curve. 
According to the principle of transfers, as formulated by Dalton 
(1920), the inequality in a certain distribution y can be reduced by 
transferring a (small) amount from individual m to n if yn < ym. 
Repeated use of this principle leads to the conclusion that every 
vector x of which the elements can be written as a weighted average of 
the elements of y is less unequal than y. Such a weighted average can 
be written as: 
xn= Pin yi + ••• + PNn VN for n-1,...,N (2) 
where the weights satisfy the following constraints: 
p m n £ 0 for all m, n 
Jp i n + ... + p N n = 1 for all n (3) 
Pmi + ... + PmN = 1 for a11 m 
The -N x N matrix P with elements p m n satisfying (3) is called doubly 
stochastic. 
The following theorem has been proved about doubly stochastic ma-
trices (Hardy, Littlewood and Polya, 1931*): 
Theorem 1. A necessary and sufficiënt condition that xLy is that 
there exists a doubly stochastic matrix P such that x=yP. 
Another theorem on inequalities owing to Hardy, Littlewood and Polya 
(193^) reads as follows: 
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Theorem 2. A necessary and sufficiënt condition that xLy is that 
for all continuous concave functions g: R -»• R: 
g(xj + ... +
 g(xN) > g(yi) + ... + g(yN) (4) 
If the function g in (4) is interpreted as an individual welfare 
function, Theorem 2 implies that the sum of individual welfare levels 
is increased when the income distribution becomes more equal (see 
Atkinson, 1970). 
For more results on the properties and measurement of inequality, 
refer to e.g. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), Dasgupta et al. (1973) 
and Marshall and Olkin (1979). 
3. Inequality of the Whole versus the Parts 
Consider a variable such as income, which can be decomposed into two 
or more parts, for example: labour versus non-labour income, income 
from agricultural versus non-agricultural activities, household income 
earned by female versus male household members. To understand the 
nature of income inequality observed, it may be illuminating to know 
how inequality in the various income components relates to aggregate 
inequality. Does the aggregation of income components lead to a miti-
gation of componentwise inequalities, or may it have an aggravating 
effect? To answer such questions, one needs a basis to compare in-
equalities among various income components. Definition 1 cannot serve 
as such a basis, since it only deals with inequality comparisons 
between two different distributions of the same amount of income. A 
slightly modified definition of inequality will therefore be used. 
Consider N observations on the variables u (ut,... ,UJJ) and 
v(v1,..., VJJ) . Assume, that the observations have been ranked in 
decreasing order: ut£—Su^j and v ^ . . .iv^, and that their sums are 
positive. Then the following definition can be formulated: 
Definition 2. The distribution of variable u is less unequal 
than the distribution of variable v (denoted as uVv) if: 
(u1+...+un)/(u1+...+uN) S (v1+...+vn)/(v1+...+vN) 
for n=1,...,N-1, where ul+...+uN>0 and V!+...+VN>0 (5) 
In the present context, u and v may stand for any pair of income 
components, but also for any combination of total income and one of 
the income components. 
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The fol lowing lemma can e a s i l y be proved: 
Lemma 1 . Consider the v a r i a b l e s u, wi th Uj + . . . + U N > 0 , and v, 
wi th v1 + . . . + v N > 0 . Let s n be def ined as u n / ( u 1 + . . . +UJJ) and 
t n as vn/(vx+...+Vfl), for n = 1 , . . . , N . Then uVv i f and only i f 
s L t . 
In t h i s lemma the equiva lence i s formulated between i n e q u a l i t y compar-
i sons in terms of V for uns tandard ized v a r i a b l e s u and v, and i n e q u a l -
i t y comparisons in terms of L for t h e i r s t a n d a r d i z e d c o u n t e r p a r t s s 
and t . The use of Lemma 1 i s t h a t Theorems 1 and 2 can be made a p p l i -
cab le t o uns tandard ized v a r i a b l e s . 
d iv ided i n t o J components for N i n d i v i -Consider total income u
.> 
duals: 
u
.n = uin+ •• •
 +
 ujn ( n = 1 , . . . , N ) (6) 
Let Uj denote the row vec tor ( U J t , . . . , u j j j ) , r e p r e s e n t i n g the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of component j . In the fo l lowing theorem, a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between i n e q u a l i t y in t o t a l income and i n e q u a l i t y in the income compo-
nents i s fo rmula ted . 
Theorem 3 . Let UjV^ for j = 2 , . . . , J . Then for t o t a l income u_ 
as def ined i n ( 6 ) : u Vu,. 
Proof. Let the s t anda rd i zed value of Uj n be denoted as t j n , so 
t h a t for a l l j and n: 
fcjn- ujn/(uji + - - - + U j N ) ( 7 ) 
F u r t h e r , u . i s used t o denote the mean value of Ui. , . . . , u.,T and u J J 1 JN 
denotes the mean value of u # 1 , . . . , u # ^ . Then t > n , the s t a n d a r d -
ized value of u > n , can be expressed as a weighted mean of the t j n : 
t , n = ( u , / u i ) t i n + . . . + ( u j / u J t J N n=1 N (8) 
When UjVUi for all j*1, Lemma 1 implies that tjLtt for all j*1, 
where tj denotes the row vector (tjj,...,tJN). Then, according 
to Theorem 1, there is a doubly stochastic matrix Pj for each j*1 
such that tj= tjPj. When this result is substituted into (8), one 
obtains for t#= (t.t»---» t.N^: 
t.=t1C(ü1/ü.)I+(ü2/ü.)P2+(ü3/ü.)P3+...(üJ/ü.)PJ], (9) 
where I is the unit matrix. It can easily be verified that the matrix 
between square brackets in (9) is a doubly stochastic matrix. There-
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fore, one raay conclude by means of Theorem 1 that t#Ltlt whioh in 
its turn implies that u.Vu! because of Lemma 1. 
Theorem 3 says that inequality in total income is smaller than in 
the most unequal income component. This conclusion holds true irre-
spective of the inequality measure used. Thus, taking several income 
components together nas a mitigating effect on total income inequali-
ty. 
A limitation of Theorem 3 is that it is based on the assumption that 
one of the income components is more unequally distributed than all 
of the other components. In practice, one will often find that Lorenz 
curves intersect so that two distributions are obtained, of which the 
inequalities are incomparable. The usual way of dealing with this 
incompleteness problem in L and V is the use of one or more inequality 
measures. This allows for inequality comparisons, even when the Lorenz 
criterion is indecisive (see e.g. Fields and Fei, 1978). This will be 
the subject of the next section. 
4. Decomposition of Total Income Inequality 
In this section, a decomposition of total income inequality will be 
given, using the coëfficiënt of variation. Some attention will also be 
given to the Gini-coefficient. 
The coëfficiënt of variation for income component j is defined as: 
cv.- /(1/N)Z(u. -ü.)VÜ. (10) 
J
 n jn j j 
where u., the mean value of income component j, is assumed to be posi-
u 
tive. Similarly, the coëfficiënt of variation for total income is: 
cv = /(1/n)z(u - ü )2/ü (11) 
.n 
n 
where mean income u is assumed to be positive. Substitution of (6) 
and (10) into (11) leads to: 
cv = /[(Z ü.cv.)2 - H]7ü (12) 
j J J 
where H is defined as follows: 
H = 2 j < l j + i j£i Gj V 1 - r j j ' ) c v j c v r ( 1 3 ) 
with rjj» being the Pearson correlation coëfficiënt between compo-
nents j and j'. If all mutual correlations between the welfare compo-
nents are equal to 1, H would vanish in (12), so that cv# can simply 
be written as a weighted mean of all individual CVJ, the weights 
being equal to u./u . If some of these correlations are smaller than 
J • 
1, H is positive, which has a mitigating effect on total income in-
equality as measured by the coëfficiënt of variation. 
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It is not difficult to check that (12) is consistent with Theorem 3, 
since if CVJ< cVj for all j*1 , then cv.ScVj. To investigate more 
deeply how inequality in total incorae depends on the correlations 
between income components, assume that inequality in all components is 
equal to cv. Further, let the average share of each incorae component 
(u./u#) be equal to (1/J), and assume that the correlations between 
all components are equal: rjj»« r for all j*j'. Then (12) can be re-
written as: 
cv = cT /(1/J) + r(J-1)/J (12') 
N' 0 .25 .50 .75 1.00 
1 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1 .000 1 .000 
2 .707 .791 .866 .935 1 .000 
5 .447 .632 .773 .894 1 .000 
10 .316 .570 .742 .880 1 .000 
100 .100 .507 .711 .867 1 .000 
00 
.000 .500 .707 .866 1 .000 
Table 1. Coëfficiënt of variation cv of total income relative to cv of 
income coraponents as a function of intercomponent correlation 
r given the number of components J. 
Table 1, displaying the relationship between cv_/cv and the corre-
lation coëfficiënt r for sorae values of J, shows how strongly the 
aggregate inequality depends on r for larger values of J. Correlation 
coefficients around zero and may give rise to a very strong reduction 
of aggregate inequality versus componentwise income inequality. 
Along similar lines, it can be shown that for the Gini coëfficiënt G 
the following result holds true: 
G.= (I ü G - H)/u. (14) 
j J J 
where 
H = 2 z E u. w. /N2 (15) 
J n ^ ^ 
The factors Wj n in (15) indicate the differences in rank of Uj and 
u. in the following way. Let rank 1 be assigned to the highest 
value, rank 2 to the one but highest value, etc. Let for a certain j 
and n the ranks of uj and u, be k and 1, respectively. Then 
w. = 1-k (note: Z w. = 0 ) . Thus, the factors w. are related to jn
 n jn jn 
Spearman's rank correlation coëfficiënt. When the rank correlation 
between the various uj and u. is perfect, all wjn will be zero 
and thus H=0. In the case of non-perfect rank correlation, H can be 
shown to be positive, which has a mitigating influence on total income 
inequality as measured by the Gini coëfficiënt. 
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It is not difficult to check that the results for both inequality 
measures discussed are consistent with Theorem 3- Also in other re-
spects, the results for the coëfficiënt of variation and the Gini 
coëfficiënt are similar. In the case of perfect correlation between 
the income components, total income inequality can be decomposed as a 
weighted mean of inequality of individual income components, the 
weights being Uj/u.. The correction terms H depend on correlations 
among the income components and/or total income, although the correla-
tion coefficients used differ. With cv, use is made of the product 
moment correlation coëfficiënt, whereas for G a correlation coëffi-
ciënt is used which is related to Spearman's rank correlation. 
5. Decomposition of Welfare Inequality 
The above sections only deal with decomposition of variables such as 
income, which is related to its components by m.eans of a linear addi-
tive relation which holds true by definition. One may wonder whether 
the results obtained are also valid in the more general context of 
welfare inequality. Thus, consider a welfare function g: RJ -» R 
assigning a real value zn to the vector of welfare components 
vin,..., vj n such as income, health, accessibility of public 
services, etc.: 
zn= S(vin vJn) n=1 N (16) 
More specifically, assume that g is an additive separable function: 
zn= «, f1(vin)+...+aj fj(vJn) n-1,...,N (17) 
where each fj is a utility function over the j-th component, 
fj(vjn) is scaled from zero to one, and the weights aj sum to 
one (cf. Keeney and Raiffa, 1976). In this case, the following refor-
mulation of Theorem 3 holds true: 
Theorem 3'- Let fj(vj)Vf1(vl) for j=2,...,J. 
Then zVf^vJ. 
Proof. The proof runs along similar lines with Theorem 3. The only 
essential difference is that in (9), the weight applied to the doubly 
stochastic matrix Pj does not only depend on the mean value of 
component j, relative to the aggregate value, but also on the factor 
a . ; i.e. u /u# is replaced by <x .f • (v. )/z. 
J U J o J 
Thus, given the welfare function (17), the simultaneous consideration 
of welfare components leads to a degree of inequality which is smaller 
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than the inequality in the most unequal component. Table 1 implies in 
this context that low or zero correlation coefficients between the 
welfare components lead to a substantial reduction of aggregate wel-
fare inequality compared with componentwise welfare inequality. 
The mitigation of inequality which takes place with the additive 
separable welfare function is due to the infinite substitution elasti-
city of this function: bad scores for a certain welfare component can 
be fully compensated by high scores for another welfare component. 
Thus, one may expect a mitigation of inequality when the welfare 
components are not perfectly correlated. 
The following example shows that with a lower substitution elastici-
ty, mitigation of inequality is no longer guaranteed. Let z be a 
welfare function with zero substitution elasticity: 
zn = min Vj n n=1,...,N (18) 
j 
Consider the following observations for three individuals and two 
welfare components (N=3; J=2): v ^ (1,1,0) and v2= (.8, .2, 1.0). 
Thus, inequality in component 1 is greater than in component 2, ac-
cording to Definitions 1 and 2. For z one obtains: z=(.8, .2, .0), so 
that according to Definition 2, z is more unequal than both Vj and v2. 
Thus, with welfare function (18), the joint consideration of various 
welfare components may lead to a more serious diagnosis of inequality 
than the individual welfare indicators would suggest. 
6. Example: Interregional Welfare Inequalities 
An empirical example of multidimensional inequality comparisons will 
be given for Dutch regional data from 1976-1978 (see Van Veenendaal, 
1981 for details). Data have been collected for 40 regions and 13 
welfare components (N=40, J=13), relating to socio-economic condi-
tions, environmental quality and infrastructure. The location of the 
regions has been depicted in Figure 1. The mean population size of the 
regions is approximately 350,000 inhabitants. 
The socio-economic variables are: 
1. fiscal income per capita 
2. unemployment rate 
3. wealth per capita 
4. index of cost of living. 
The environmental variables are: 
5. population density 
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Figure 1• Location of HO regions in the Netherlands 
^ 
^ 
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v-'-\ 
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6. size of natural environment as percentage of total regional area 
7. index of industrialiation related to regional area 
8. index of the emission of pollutants related to regional area. 
The infrastructural variables are; 
9. density of transport network 
10. index of cultural centres and sport accomodation per capita 
11. index of number of schools of various types per capita 
12. distance to the centre of the Netherlands 
13. index of various medical services per capita. 
The outcomes of the coëfficiënt of variation for the 13 welfare 
components are represented in Table 2. The table indicates that the 
interregional inequality in the socio-economic variables is relatively 
small, while the inequality in the environmental variables is rela-
tively large. For the infrastructural variables we find in most cases 
intermediate positions. 
s u b - p r o f i l e component componentwise aggrega te cv 
j c o ë f f i c i ë n t of per s u b p r o f i l e 
v a r i a t i o n CVJ 
1 .08 
30cio-economic 2 
3 
4 
.41 
.34 
.07 
.17 
5 .88 
snvironment 6 .70 .63 
7 
8 
.76 
.94 
9 
10 
.42 
.44 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e 11 
12 
13 
.17 
1 .24 
.43 
.31 
Table 2. Coefficients of variation for 13 welfare components and 3 
sub-profiles. 
The above statements hold for the variables in the three sub-pro-
files independently. It is also interesting to know the degree of 
inequality for a composite variable representing a whole sub-profile. 
These con )osite variables have been constructed by calculating the 
unweighted average of the normalized variables in each profile. For 
the three composite variables, we find as outcomes for the coëfficiënt 
of variation cv (.17, .63, .31). When we compare this outcome with the 
mean values of cv in Table 2 per sub-profile (.22, .82, .54), we note 
that the rank order is the same and that in all cases the former is 
smaller than the latter. The relative and absolute decrease is largest 
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for the infrastructure variable, which means that inequality raitiga-
tion occurs to a larger extent in this sub-profile than in the other 
sub-profiles. From (12) and (13) one knows that the degree of inequal-
ity mitigation depends among others on the correlation coefficients 
per sub-profile. As can be seen from Table 3, the correlation coeffi-
cients among variables in the infrastructure block are relatively low 
so that i t is no surprise to find a relatively high degree of inequal-
ity mitigation for this sub-profile. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 
1 .00 .57 .60 - . 17 - .84 .30 - .63 - .83 .77 .05 .15 .62 .55 
.57 1 .00 .49 - . 13 - . 4 0 • 31 - . 5 6 - . 37 .25 - . 15 .17 .72 .24 
.60 .49 1.00 .06 - .39 .29 - .11 - . 3 6 .36 .12 .15 .28 .46 
- . 17 - . 13 .06 1.00 .04 - . 2 4 - . 09 .01 - .01 
- .94 
.17 
- . 1 0 
- . 06 
- .01 
- . 2 4 
- . 5 2 
.04 
- .84 - . 4 0 - . 39 0.04 1 .00 - . 19 .76 .97 - . 4 7 
• 30 .31 .29 - . 24 - .19 1 .00 - . 17 - . 09 .15 - .04 .04 .25 .19 
- . 63 - . 56 - .11 - . 0 9 .76 - . 17 1 .00 .69 - . 6 8 - . 03 • 03 - . 55 - . 49 
- . 83 - . 37 
.25 
- . 36 .01 
.36 - .01 
.97 - .09 .69 1 .00 - .91 - . 1 1 - . 01 - . 5 2 - . 4 7 
.77 - . 94 .15 - . 68 - .91 1 .00 .04 - . 02 .46 .38 
.05 - . 15 .12 .17 - .10 - . 04 - . 03 - .11 .04 1 .00 .01 - . 1 7 .09 
.15 .17 .15 - . 06 - .01 .04 .03 - .01 - . 0 2 .01 1 .00 .12 .27 
.62 .72 .28 - . 24 - .52 .25 - .55 - .52 .46 - . 17 .12 1 .00 .18 
.55 .24 .46 .04 - .47 .19 - .49 - . 47 .38 .09 .27 .18 1 .00 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for 13 welfare components.1) 
An even s t r o n g e r r educ t i on of i n e q u a l i t y i s obta ined when an o v e r a l l 
welfare i n d i c a t o r i s formula ted , based on the t h r e e s u b - p r o f i l e s 
mentioned above. The reason i s t h a t t h e r e i s a r a t h e r s t r o n g nega t ive 
c o r r e l a t i o n between the environmental index (E) on the one hand, and 
the socio-economic (SE) as well as the i n f r a s t r u c t u r e ( I ) index on the 
o ther hand (see Table 4 ) . For example, i f a l i n e a r i n d i c a t o r of t o t a l 
welfare i s formulated based on the t h r e e s u b - p r o f i l e i n d i c e s with 
weights asE= -6 . ag= «2 and aj= . 2 , one o b t a i n s for the cv of 
t o t a l wel fa re a value - o f .13- This i s much lower than the weighted 
average of the cv of the t h r e e i n d i v i d u a l s u b - p r o f i l e s ( . 2 9 ) . Of 
course , t h i s r e s u l t depends on the weights used. In Table 5 the o u t -
comes of cv a r e given for some a l t e r n a t i v e combinations of we igh t s . 
SE IS I 
1.00 - . 35 .62 
- . 3 5 1.00 - . 6 3 
.62 -.63 1.00 
socio-economic (SE) 
environment (E) 
infrastructure (I) 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients for 3 sub-profile indices. 
12 
weig hts c o ë f f i c i ë n t o f 
aSE aE a i v a r i a t i o n cv 
1 .0 .0 .0 
.173 
.8 .2 .0 .149 
Co
 
.0 .2 .181 
.6 .4 .0 .213 
.6 .2 .2 .135 
.6 .0 .4 .200 
.4 .6 .0 .329 
.4 .4 .2 .187 
.4 .2 .4 .137 
.4 .0 .6 .229 
.2 .8 .0 .471 
.2 .6 .2 • 303 
.2 .4 .4 .170 
.2 .2 .6 .155 
.2 .0 .8 .265 
.0 1.0 .0 .633 
.0 .8 .2 .447 
.0 .6 .4 .281 
.0 .4 .6 .165 
.0 .2 .8 .187 
.0 .0 1.0 .308 
Table 5. Dependence of coëfficiënt of variation of 
welfare on weights of welfare function. 
A 
In the present case it may be concluded that a linear welfare func-
jtion leads to a degree of welfare inequality which is much lower than 
{the average inequality in the individual welfare components. Comparing 
jinterregional inequality in total welfare with interregional income 
'inequality (variable 1) one finds that the two are rather near, when 
using Table 2 as a frame of reference. Most individual variables 
display inequalities which are much higher. Yet, it is interesting to 
i note that in the present case despite all mitigating effects, interre-
\ j gional welfare inequality is still higher than interregional income 
f i inequality. An implication is that even if interregional income in-
| ) 
H equalities are reiatively small, governments may have good reasons not 
' t to ignore regional specifie policies in view of broader based welfare 
;
 inequalities among regions. 
Note 
1) Variables 2, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 12 have been multiplied with a factor 
of -1 so that for all variables a larger value is preferred to a 
smaller one. 
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